My sympathies go out to our brethren who produce electronic voting machines.

For those not following the progress in this arena, after the voting fiasco in Florida during the last presidential election, there was a concerted effort to improve the way citizens cast votes.

Fortunately for companies like Diebold, Sequoia Voting Systems, AccuPoll, ES&S and SAIC, most government agencies decided that electronic voting was the answer. In fact, 34 states purchased voting machines, so that in this election more than 33 percent of registered voters would cast their ballots on some type of e-voting machine.

It would be difficult not to call this a huge success for our industry. Most people would say the machines are very simple to use because the touch technology is much more intuitive than the old mechanical or punch-card systems.

The machines can be programmed to operate in a wide variety of languages, which can be selected by the voter upon entering the polling area. The systems also don’t allow a voter inadvertently to choose more than one candidate in a race—a big problem in the Florida debacle—and they work great when equipped with headphones so that even a blind person can work through the process on his own. This is certainly a huge step toward improving and simplifying the voting experience.

So why am I feeling sympathy for e-voting manufacturers? There is a huge backlash underway toward the adoption of e-voting systems, and the momentum seems to be growing.

A small but very vocal group of elected officials, activists and computer scientists have made this the cause du jour. Rather than working for the betterment of a system that is clearly an improvement over what existed before, they are asking that the plug be pulled on it altogether.

According to Time magazine in an article titled “The Vexations of Voting Machines” (May 3, 2004), most critics of e-voting machines have two complaints. With the machines, critics say, it’s not possible to do a true recount because a recount means pressing a button and getting the same results. Also, they allege, the systems are vulnerable to tampering and simple breakdowns.

Huh? The recount argument is like saying that electronic calculators are bad because when you add the same two numbers together you always get the same answer. Wasn’t that the whole idea behind the e-voting machine, to take out the guesswork?

I remember watching the recount of the Florida election and seeing people around a table arguing about hanging chads and for which candidate a vote was cast. Shouldn’t there be a concern that the counters have a bias?

I’m sure there are conspiracy theorists who would argue the machines could be programmed with a bias, but guarding against that scenario becoming a reality are checks and balances, not to mention the future viability of large public companies.

Time also showed a picture with a caption indicating that someone picked a lock on a Diebold system in 10 seconds, gaining access to a memory card. Okay, Diebold needs to install better locks, but I still don’t understand the damning weight of the issue.

Are we saying the locks were more secure on the wooden boxes that Florida voters used? Would it take 15 seconds to break into the wooden boxes?

Election boards and manufacturers have been quick to respond. Nevada now requires its voting machines to produce a paper trail of receipts available for recount, and California is mandating printed receipts by 2006.

While I’m sure this is great news for the printer companies, it makes about as much sense as mailing hard copies of your e-mail.

The fact of the matter is, there will always be resistance to change. I’m sure that in the rush to deploy tens of thousands of machines our industry did not achieve perfection.

Does the technology need to be improved to make it more secure? Absolutely. But isn’t that always the case with something new? Let’s get on with the job.